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ABSTRACT
Oswald hypothesizes that regions and countries with high homeownership rates will
experience higher natural rates of unemployment and that rising homeownership in OECD countries
since the 1960s provides a key explanation for the rise in the natural rate of unemployment over the
same time period. Recent tests of the Oswald thesis have found the opposite. This study differs from
earlier ones both by considering different states of ownership (degrees of leverage) and types of
tenancy (private, public, and rent-free) and by examining data from Australia, rather than the U.S.
We demonstrate that the recent anti-Oswald results are the result of (1) highly leveraged owners
having a greater incentive to remain employed and to become reemployed more rapidly that outright
owners and (2) those paying below-market rents having a lower incentive to avoid unemployment or
become reemployed than those paying market rents.  The only positive Oswald result is that females
who are outright owners have significantly slower exits from unemployment.  Overall, homeownership
does not increase unemployment.
Finally, in line with expectations but in contrast to some earlier studies, our results indicate a
significant impact of the predicted replacement ratio (unemployment benefits to wage if reemployed)
on unemployment behavior.  Persons with a higher predicted ratio are significantly more likely to
become unemployed, and unemployed females with a higher predicted replacement ratio have longer
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Andrew Oswald (1996, 1997) has argued forcefully, based upon analysis of time series and cross-
section data for OECD countries and regions within selected OECD countries, that homeownership 
causes unemployment. He concludes that if the rate of homeownership rises by five percentage 
points, unemployment will rise by one percentage point, an effect so large that it would place 
homeownership at the center of explanations for the rise in the natural rate of unemployment since 
the 1960s in OECD countries. Oswald (1996, p.2) suggests ‘[M]ass unemployment exists because 
of a secular change that has happened in all but a few Western housing markets – the rise of 
homeownership and the decline of private renting’.
1 
Two straight-forward rationales have been offered for the Oswald result. First, homeowners 
face higher selling and buying costs compared to renters when they consider a move to a new 
location to accept a job offer. As a result, homeowners may be more likely to become unemployed 
(may be less willing to accept job transfers to or job opportunities in distant locations) and may 
remain unemployed longer (have a greater reluctance to search in distant locations requiring a 
move). Second, homeowners may, through their voting power in local government, enforce 
restrictive planning and land development laws depressing employment options and thus 
increasing unemployment. 
Oswald’s claim about the size and direction of the relationship between unemployment and 
homeownership has attracted the attention of both housing and labor economists. A number of 
studies have mimicked Oswald’s aggregate regional analysis, analyzing data from different regions 
and adding additional covariates. Nickell and Layard (1999) add covariates in an analysis of the 
original OECD country data. Green and Hendershott (2001) and Partridge and Rickman (1997) 
                                                      
1 The rise in secular unemployment since the 1960s has been far more prominent in Western Europe than in the U.S. a 
fact that has prompted considerable debate among labor and macroeconomists (see Nickell, 1998). 4 
both analyze US state data, adjusting for age composition and other factors, and Pehkonen (1997) 
examines Finnish data. All of these studies find confirmation of Oswald’s result, with the 
magnitude of the response ranging from a one to two percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate for a ten percentage point increase in the homeownership rate. 
Three studies have tested the Oswald thesis using US micro datasets.
2 Goss and Phillips 
(1997) examine the impact of housing equity levels on the duration of unemployment using the 
1986 Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find that homeownership reduces the duration of 
unemployment as compared with other tenures with the effect stronger for mortgagees as 
compared with outright owners.
3 Coulson and Fisher (2002) find that homeowners have 
significantly lower probabilities of being unemployed and typically earn significantly higher wages 
than renters. They also find that homeownership exerts a significant negative influence upon the 
length of the unemployment spell. Green and Hendershott (2002) examined the duration of 
unemployment of roughly 2500 Americans who became unemployed during the 1985-92 period. 
In a two-component analysis, they first estimate a probit explaining homeownership and then relate 
the duration of unemployment to predicted homeownership. Rather than Oswald’s predicted 
positive relationship, they, too, find a negative relationship. 
How can we rationalize these seemingly counter intuitive results?  While the logic of 
Oswald’s argument seems impeccable if we are comparing outright owners and private renters, 
some owners are highly leveraged and some renters occupy public housing or live rent-free with 
relatives. Homeowners with weak housing equity positions may require quick re-employment to 
                                                      
2 Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2000) study a number of Oswald’s sub-hypotheses regarding labour force mobility 
using micro-panel data from the Netherlands. 
3 Goss and Phillips’ (1997) study was published shortly after Oswald’s (working) paper was released and undertaken in 
ignorance of it. Nevertheless, the authors’ tests do in practice represent tests of the Oswald thesis. 5 
enable them to continue making their mortgage payments.
4  Thus they may specify lower 
reservation wages than equivalently qualified renters, leading to the greater possibility of shorter 
durations of unemployment (Goss and Phillips, 1997). 
The presence of public housing with tenants paying long-term below-market rents and of 
free-renters also confounds the analysis. Hendershott and Hu (1982) showed that significantly 
leveraged owners with below-market financing rates should be reluctant to move if that requires 
giving up their below-market financing (see Quigley, 1987, for empirical support). Similarly, 
public housing tenants and free-renters should be reluctant to give up their below-market rents. A 
large literature has found UK public tenants to be less mobile between regions and to experience 
higher levels of unemployment (Engleman, 1977; Bover, Muellbauer, and Murphy, 1989; Hughes 
and McCormick, 1981, 1985, 1987; McCormick, 1983; Minford, Ashton, and Peel, 1988).  
The present study employs an Australian micro dataset that is particularly strong both on 
the labor market position of the respondents and their housing status. This allows more refined 
tests of more sophisticated versions of the Oswald thesis in a different country setting. We also 
employ the predicted ratio of unemployment benefits to wages if employed as an explanatory 
variable in the analyses, a variable missing from earlier analyses. We provide strong evidence that 
our counter-Oswald results are due to the behavior of leveraged owners and public housing tenants.  
In fact, when we compare outright owners (rather than leveraged owners) with private renters 
(rather that public renters), we find strong evidence, particularly for females that renters are slower 
to become reemployed than owners.  More specifically, female outright owners and public housing 
occupants are equally less likely to exit unemployment as rapidly as private renters and owners 
with mortgages. 
                                                      
4 Moreover, homeowners with large mortgages can be subject to negative equity problems resulting in significant 
housing lock-in effects (see Archer, Ling and McGill, 1996, Caplin, Freeman and Tracy, 1997 and Henley, 1998). 6 
Four tests are employed to deduce the impact of homeownership, public housing and 
leverage on unemployment. The first two tests focus solely on the relationship between the 
aggregate housing tenure type ‘homeownership’ and unemployment. First, we estimate a probit 
explaining the probability of being unemployed using (actual or predicted) homeownership as a 
determinant (the choice between the two options being made on a prior test for exogeneity of 
homeownership). Second we estimate a hazard equation explaining the factors influencing duration 
of a spell of unemployment. Our final two tests move beyond this broad specification to consider, 
in turn, the role of leverage in influencing the incidence and duration of unemployment of 
homeowners and the impact of multiple housing tenures (outright owners, mortgages, public 
renters, private renters and free renters on unemployment outcomes). 
The remainder of the paper contains four sections. In Section 2, we present the models to 
be estimated. These include probits for being unemployed and a hazard for the duration of 
unemployment. Section 3 elaborates on the data used in the study. The data used in this study are 
drawn from the pooling of four consecutive Australian cross-section surveys from the mid to late 
1990s (the 1994-97 Surveys of Income and Housing Costs, SIHC). These data provide rich 
housing, labor market and income data and importantly include a tracking of the respondent’s labor 
force position over an eight-month period. The latter feature injects a longitudinal module into the 
data and is used in our unemployment spell analysis. Section 4 provides our results on 
unemployment and the duration of unemployment. We briefly summarize and look toward future 
work in Section 5. 
 
2. The Models  
Homeownership can correlate with the probability of becoming unemployed or the duration of 
unemployment either because homeownership really matters or because it is correlated with other 7 
unobservable factors that help determine both tenure choice and the probability or duration of 
unemployment. For example, the user cost of a household with a long expected holding period is 
lower than that of one with a shorter expected length of stay due to the longer amortization of up-
front stamp duties (taxes) and back-out brokerage fees. One reason for long expected lengths of 
stay is a greater desire to retain proximity to family members and friends. If such owners become 
unemployed, they will tend to remain unemployed longer than renters who become unemployed, 
but it is due to their wish to remain proximate to family rather than being caused by their tenure 
status. 
There is, therefore, no guarantee that homeownership is an exogenous determinant of 
unemployment and we need to directly test for exogeneity in the homeownership effect on both the 
probability of unemployment and its duration. Our test is a simple extended regression test in 
which actual homeownership and a prediction error term (the difference between actual 
homeownership and predicted homeownership) are entered in relevant preliminary models. 
Because the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient on the error term is rejected, we use predicted 
homeownership in our final equation (i.e., an unemployment probit, and an unemployment spell 
hazard model).  
The probability of being a homeowner is expressed as: 
 
Probit:    Oi = P (β1 Yi +  β2 Ji  +  µi )         ( 1 )  
 
where i, represents the decision-making unit and Oi indicates tenure choice, taking a value 1 if the 
unit is a home owner and 0 otherwise. Explanatory variables include real income (Y) and a matrix 
(J) of demographic identifiers (importantly age ranges, but also country of birth, race, gender, 
marital status), human capital variables (education outcomes) and location dummies (divided into 8 
capital city and rest of the state dummies). As elsewhere, house prices and rents in Australia differ 
markedly across geographic location and thus geographic locators provide proxies for housing cost 
determinants of tenure choice. 
While otherwise unremarkable, one feature of our tenure choice model needs to be 
emphasized. We assume that the tenure choice decision-making unit is the ‘income unit’ rather 
than the ‘household’, the common approach in most tenure choice models. The income unit (a unit 
of analysis used in social policy analyses in the Australian context) is defined as one person or a 
group of related persons who reside within a single residential dwelling whose command over 
income is assumed to be common.
5 The household comprises all persons in a given dwelling.  
In most cases, households and income units are one and the same entity. A single person, 
living alone, is both an income unit and a household; so too the couple with or without dependent 
children, in which case income is aggregated and where it is inappropriate to combine the attributes 
of the couple (e.g., age) we simply take the attributes of the head (the person with the highest 
income) of the couple (thus the predicted ownership of head and spouse will be equal). Households 
and income units are different (and the predicted probabilities of ownership will differ) when 
unrelated people live together in the same dwelling or when children grow up but remain in the 
family home even when they are no longer (notionally) dependent on their parents. The former are 
assumed to split the rent unless the data indicate otherwise; the latter are assumed to be living rent 
free. Each unrelated person in a household is making an independent housing tenure decision as is 
the young adult still living at home.  
 
                                                      
5 Following the practice of the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) —the data manager of the survey data used in 
this study— income sharing is assumed to take place between married (registered or de facto) couples and between 
parents and dependent children (see ABS, 1999, p. 16). The ABS defines dependent children ‘as all persons aged under 
15 years and persons aged 15-24 years who are full-time students, live with a parent or guardian and do not have a 
spouse or offspring of their own living with them’ (see ABS, 1999, p. 15). 9 
Probability of Being Unemployed 
The probability of an individual being unemployed is expressed as 
 
Probit    Ui = P (γ 1 O*i + γ 2Ri  +   γ3´ St + γ4´ θt +  µi)       ( 2 )  
  
where O*i is predicted/actual homeownership, Ri is the predicted replacement ratio, S is a matrix of 
socio-demographic determinants of unemployment and θt is a matrix of quarterly time dummies 
that account for time-related shocks (recall that our data are pooled cross-section). To determine 
whether or not predicted or actual homeownership should be used for estimation purposes, we 
include in a preliminary model actual homeownership and the prediction error term. The latter term 
is equal to the actual housing tenure state (1 for the home owner and 0 for the non-home owner) 
less the predicted probability of being a homeowner (from the tenure choice probit model — 
equation 1). For the homeowner, the term is positive and increases as the predicted probability of 
being a renter rises (1 –  i O ˆ ). For the non-home owner, the term is negative and in this case the 
absolute value increases as the error rises (0 –  i O ˆ ). 
A key economic determinant of the probability of being unemployed is the predicted 
replacement ratio of the individual. This ratio is measured as the weekly unemployment benefit an 
individual is predicted to receive relative to their predicted weekly wage. The higher the 
replacement ratio, the lower is the opportunity cost of being unemployed (the smaller is the relative 
loss in wages) and consequently the higher the expected probability of being unemployed. 
Estimates of expected earnings are based on a standard human capital OLS regression (estimated 10 
separately for women and men), which includes age categories to proxy for potential labor force 
experience and educational qualifications.
6 
As opposed to Coulson and Fisher (2002) and Green and Hendershott (2002), we have 
measures of unemployment benefits in the data and use these estimates to predict an 
unemployment benefit to all persons, which accounts for non-wage income and the socio-
demographic determinants that enter the administrative rules that apply to unemployment benefits 
in Australia. All other things being equal, unemployment benefits are higher for those over age 21, 
those with more children and those with lower wealth and private income. Income and assets tests 
reduce the level of the benefit until the payment drops to zero. A rental subsidy applies to 
unemployed private renters. This is unlike the contributory U.S. unemployment insurance benefit 
system where benefits are positively related to past earnings. Another crucial difference between 
the two systems is that in the U.S. there is benefit exhaustion whereas in Australia there is no direct 
benefit exhaustion but an emphasis on the unemployment benefit recipient complying with job 
search and work-for-benefit guidelines as the spell of unemployment lengthens. The vector θt 
includes quarterly time dummies that will be used to capture shocks in real economic activity that 
affect the time path of unemployment. 
The probit model of unemployment is based on the individual unit of analysis and includes 
all persons in the labor force. We delete persons aged 65 and over and dependent children aged 15-
24. The probit model is then estimated separately for men and for women. The inverse Mills ratios 
(φ/Φ) from these equations will be used in the unemployment duration hazard functions to correct 
for sample selection bias. 
 
                                                      
6 Our results are not reported in this paper. Educational qualifications exert their anticipated strong positive impact on 
wages, as does potential labor market experience (age classifications). 11 
II.  Duration of Unemployment 
Under Oswald’s thesis, homeownership leads to higher unemployment. Given the key 
transmission mechanism through which homeownership is expected to lead to higher 
unemployment — the relative immobility of homeowners — we would expect longer durations of 
unemployment as well. In this section, we model the duration of unemployment using a hazard 
analysis. But before discussing our hazard model, we make clear how we measure spells of 
unemployment; an obvious requirement but one that is not always met in studies of 
unemployment. 
Two questions need to be answered regarding spells of unemployment. First, when does a 
spell of unemployment begin and end? Second, how do we deal with the missing information 
problem evident in all data sets when spells of unemployment begin prior to the opening of a data 
set’s window or end after that window is closed?
7 The latter problem is one of censorship bias that 
cannot be overcome but can be ameliorated through sound statistical techniques, while the former 
is an issue in the meaning and characterization of unemployment spells themselves. 
The population divides itself into three states: employed, unemployed and not in the labor force (or 
NILF). This means that a spell of unemployment can begin as a result either of an individual 
entering unemployment from the state of employment (full time, FtE, or part time, PtE) or from the 
NILF labor force position. A person who enters unemployment from employment is a job loser. 
Some data sets can distinguish between voluntary job quits and involuntary retrenchments but the 
SIHC cannot. Likewise, an individual can exit from unemployment to the NILF state or to 
employment. An exit to employment can be further broken down to an exit to part-time 
employment or an exit to full-time employment (over 35 hours per week of employment). There 
are good grounds for placing emphasis on the last of these transitions (that to full-time 
                                                      
7 A dataset’s window refers to the period of direct reporting of (by) a respondent’s actions and outcomes. 12 
employment) because it represents, for most unemployed people, the best possible labor market 
transition. 
An exit to the NILF state, on the other hand, can be difficult to interpret. For some, the 
transition from unemployment to the NILF category represents the least desired transition as it 
reflects a discouraged job seeker effect (i.e., the individual is losing the desire and attachment to 
work to continue the search process). An exit to the NILF state could, however, represent a period 
of retooling through full-time education and training or a decision to undertake full-time care for 
dependent children or aged parents. Each of these transitions may be the most desired transition. 
Transitions from and to unemployment are illustrated in Figure 1a. The right and left 
censoring of unemployment spells is illustrated in Figure 1b. A spell may begin before the data 
window of the relevant data set and is referred to as a left-censored spell. Only retrospective 
questions put to respondents would ever enable researchers to determine the beginning of the spell 
(and that does not occur with the dataset used in the present circumstance). The origin of spells is, 
however, known when it begins after the start of a survey’s data window (i.e., a non-left-censored 
spell). When a spell of unemployment has not ended prior to the end of a survey’s data window the 
spell is right censored. We do not know when such spells will end. 
 
Figure 1a Labor Force Transitions 
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Figure 1b Unemployment spell types 
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    8  month  window 
Spells can be left censored (begin before the 8th month- e.g., spell A) or right 
censored (they do not end by month 8 – e.g., spell C) or be neither left or right 
censored (they begin and end within the eight month period – e.g., spell B. 
 
Our procedure is to estimate models of unemployment spells that distinguish between three 
different forms of spell endings; namely, all spell endings (including NILF, FtE and PtE transitions 
from unemployment), spells ending in employment (FtE and PtE transitions from unemployment) 
and spells ending in full-time employment. We also add a permutation to this third model in which 
the individual was employed in the first month of the data window, thereby focusing solely on job 
loss transitions. 
We adopt a hazard model of the following general form 
 
Hazard   H i = H (η 1 O*i + η  2Ri  +   η 3´ St + η 4´ θt + η 5 λi  +   µi)  (3) 
 
where H is the hazard function, where O*i is predicted/actual homeownership, Ri is the predicted 
replacement ratio, S is a matrix of socio-demographic determinants of unemployment and θt is a 
matrix of quarterly time dummies that account for time-related shocks, λi is the inverse Mills ratio 




The hazard function gives the probability that an individual leaves a particular state at a 
particular point in time conditional on being in that state prior to that point. In the present context, 
the hazard function gives the probability of exiting unemployment at a given point in time, given 
that individual had been unemployed up to that point. We shall utilize Cox’s proportional hazards 
model, where we model the hazard function using the following functional form: 
 
  h (t, X) = h (t,0) exp(b’X)          ( 4 )  
 
where h (t,0) is the baseline hazard rate. The baseline hazard rate reflects the influence of spell 
duration on the hazard rate and is independent of the set of determinants. Correspondingly, the 
second component of the hazard function exp(b’X) is independent of time but is dependent on the 
set of regression coefficients and the associated X determinants. The assumed constancy of hazards 
over time is the basis for the ‘proportional hazards’ model label. 
III.  Housing Tenure and Leverage 
We distinguish between five housing tenure states: (1) outright owners, (2) owners with 
mortgages, (3) private market renters (the default category in the regressions), (4) public renters 
and (5) free renters.
8 The latter category includes young people who still reside with their parents 
(and are not defined as dependent children) in a rent-free state. We estimate unemployment 
incidence and unemployment duration models incorporating these differentiated tenure positions. 
Our models use both actual tenure states as dummy variables and predicted tenure states utilizing 
the results of a multinomial logit model of tenure choice. The omitted tenure category is the private 
rental category (tenants paying market rents). 
                                                      
8 We note that the research on public housing fails to compare public housing with homelessness and with charity-
based housing. It could be argued that this group, typically absent from major datasets (including our own), is as 
relevant a comparison tenure for public housing as are private renters and owners. 15 
Just as missing variables threatens to confound the impact of observed ownership on 
unemployment duration, so, too, with observed public housing. Bover, Muellbauer, and Murphy 
(1989) point out that public housing typically represents ‘housing of last resort’. They suggest that 
it would be natural to expect that a number of unobservable (in most datasets) characteristics such 
as low motivation, low ability, bad luck, poor health are likely to be correlated with public housing. 
This means that part of the regional mobility and unemployment differentials found between 
housing tenures may be due to unobserved heterogeneity effects as compared to housing tenure 
effects per se.  
We extend the Oswald framework in one last important respect. Among homeowners, we 
anticipate that the degree of leverage affects labor market behavior. Those with high leverage will 
typically have greater out of pocket housing costs than private renters occupying an equivalent 
dwelling, while those with low leverage will have lower costs.
9  The greater are housing expenses, 
the greater the pressure on the homeowner to return to work. To test this hypothesis, we repeat the 
above probability of unemployment and duration of unemployment estimations on homeowners 
only (and then on owners with mortgages only), using their leverage (and predicted leverage) as an 
explanatory variable. We expect that the greater the leverage, the greater the probability and/or the 
duration of unemployment. 
 
3. The Data 
The dataset used in this study is the Australian Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) 
Confidentialised Unit Record Files for the four consecutive years 1994-97 years. Roughly 13,500 
persons in private resident dwellings are surveyed in each of the four years leading to a sample of 
                                                      
9 The mortgage rate being paid includes a premium to cover expected inflation.  Rents do not need to include such a 
premium because landlords should expect to receive capital gains to compensate for inflation.  In a zero inflation world, 
out of pocket costs of owners using extreme leverage still need not exceed those of renters. 16 
56,370 individual respondents in the pooled 1994-1997 SIHC. These annual surveys were 
conducted broadly under the same sampling conditions and in a period of stable economic growth 
in Australia. We have inflated nominal values in each of the SIHC data sets to their 1997 
equivalents using the Consumer Price Index values for Australia in the relevant years. 
The sampling frame of the SIHC is all those aged 15 and over living in private residences. 
Excluded are those people resident in non-private residences (e.g., hotels, boarding schools, 
boarding houses and institutions), the homeless, those living in remote areas of the Northern 
Territory, and members of permanent defense forces. We delete from the data all income units 
whose head is aged 65 and over and dependent children over 15 (full-time students aged 15 to 24 
who themselves do not have spouses or dependent children of their own). Just over eight percent of 
the respondents in the labor force are unemployed. 
The SIHC data set is cross-sectional. However, respondents to the SIHC are drawn from 
Australia’s Monthly Population Survey (MPS), which tracks an individual’s labor force outcomes 
during an eight- month window. The MPS labor force data for each individual is linked by the 
ABS to the rich SIHC questionnaire containing housing-related questions (housing tenure, 
dwelling structure and location, estimated house value, housing loans and repayments, housing 
costs, and year of purchase), labor market questions (e.g., wages, labor force position), socio-
demographic information (e.g., age, education, country of birth, family type) and detailed income 
data.  
An overview of housing and labor force variables of the SIHC data for our modeling 
purposes is contained in Tables 1 and 2. Owners comprise 51.2 per cent of income units after 
taking into account the exclusion of those aged 65 and dependent children. While not displayed in 
Tables 1 and 2, homeownership rises with age and education level. Around half of owner-occupier 
income units are outright owners and the other half owners with mortgages. The mean loan-to-17 
value ratio for owners with mortgages is 0.43; around 12 per cent of owners with mortgages have 
loan-to-value ratios exceeding 80 percent. Private renters comprise close to one-third of income 
units in the sample while public renters represent five per cent of all income units. Income units 
neither owning nor paying rent to a landlord comprise a relatively large 11 per cent of all income 
units (the rent-free category).  
The unemployment rate for female homeowners stands at 3.9 per cent while that for male 
owners is 4.1 per cent. For both women and men the unemployment rate for owners with 
mortgages is lower than that for outright owners. In the case of males, the difference is relatively 
large; outright owners having almost twice the unemployment rate of leveraged owners. Private 
renters exhibit unemployment rates four times those of homeowners. The unemployment rate for 
female public renters is twice that of private renters, while for males the ratio of unemployed to 
employed is closer to three to one. Those in rent-free accommodation exhibit unemployment rates 
similar to those in the private rental category. 
An important economic determinant of unemployment outcomes in our models is the 
predicted replacement ratio (the ratio of unemployment benefits to earnings). We use actual weekly 
earnings and benefits to model predicted weekly earnings and benefits and so the predicted 
replacement ratio. The replacement ratio is imputed to both employed and unemployed persons in 
our sample. Weekly earnings for women are two-thirds the earnings for men (much of this is a 
lower hours effect). Because unemployment benefits are roughly equal for women and men, it is 
not surprising that predicted replacement ratios are higher for women than men. Ratios are also 
higher for unemployed persons than employed persons. The distributional results presented in 




I.  Probability of Unemployment 
We begin with tests of the simple owner-versus-renter hypothesis analogous to tests of Coulson 
and Fisher (2002) and Hendershott and Green (2002) to determine if the results for Australia are 
similar to those for the U.S.  Table 3 reports separate results for males and females on the effect of 
homeownership on unemployment after controlling for the range of confounding influences. 
Model 1 presents probit model results for the case in which we treat homeownership as an 
exogenous variable (actual homeownership) while model 2 includes both actual homeownership 
and the homeownership error term to test for exogeneity in homeownership. Because the error term 
is significant, homeownership is treated as an endogenous variable and we include predicted 
homeownership in our final unemployment probit model (Model 3).  (The coefficient on predicted 
homeownership is roughly three times that in model 1.) Our predicted homeownership variable is 
derived from a tenure choice probit model whose results are reported in Appendix Table 1. These 
results reveal a positive relationship between homeownership on the one hand and age, (income 
unit) income, and education on the other hand. Those born outside Australia tend to have lower 
rates of homeownership (all other things being equal). Couple income units have higher rates of 
homeownership than singles and homeownership rates rise with the presence of dependent 
children. 
As is evident in Table 3, predicted ownership has a large negative effect on the probability 
of unemployment for both women and men, indicating that the probability of unemployment falls 
as the predicted probability of homeownership rises. The same is true, we note in passing, for our 
model 1 results, which treated homeownership as an exogenous variable. This runs counter to the 
Oswald thesis. The precise quantitative impact of a particular variable on the probability of 
unemployment is gauged by utilizing the marginal effect (DF/dx column) estimates, which give the 19 
impact of a marginal change in the independent variable on the probability of being unemployed. 
When the variable is a zero-one dummy, the marginal effect is the impact of going from 0 to 1. 
(All marginal effect calculations are at the means of variables.) For males, the relevant marginal 
effect on predicted ownership is -0.235, while for females the relevant marginal effect value is -
0.192. In other words, a one percentage point increase in the predicted probability of being a home 
owner (say from 0.59 to 0.60) decreases the probability of a male being unemployed by 0.235 
percentage points (i.e., a drop of 0.00235 in the predicted probability of being unemployed; the 
mean probability is 0.065 or 6.5 per cent). A one percentage point increase in the predicted 
probability of a female being a home owner decreases the probability of female being unemployed 
by 0.192 per cent. 
To provide some context to these marginal effect values, consider the impact of the 
predicted replacement ratio on the probability of being unemployed. For males, a one percentage 
point increase in the ratio of predicted benefits to predicted wages (say from 0.27 to 0.28) increases 
the probability of a male being unemployed by 0.213 percentage points (i.e., an increase of 
0.00213 in the predicted probability of being unemployed). This marginal effect is approximately 
of the same magnitude as that of the predicted probability of homeownership. Hence, 
homeownership and the replacement ratio have roughly similar economic effects on the probability 
of unemployment. In the case of women, the replacement ratio marginal effect is less than half that 
for males though still significant (the marginal effect is 0.095 for women as compared with 0.213 
for men). In addition to homeownership and replacement ratio effects, our results show that the 
probability of being unemployed is related to income unit type effects, geographical location 
effects and country of birth effects.  
In Table 4, we have repeated the above estimations replacing homeownership with the full 
range of housing tenure states (the omitted tenure category is private renters). The alternative 20 
endogenous model replaces actual housing tenure states with predicted housing tenure states. 
Predictions of the appropriate housing tenure state are based on the results from a multinomial logit 
model (see Appendix Table 2). An income unit (and, therefore all relevant persons in that income 
unit) is allocated to that housing tenure state whose predicted probability value from the 
multinomial logit model is the highest among all the predicted values. So, for example, if the 
predicted probability for outright ownership was 0.52 and the predicted probabilities for each of 
the remaining housing tenures were below this value, the income unit would be assigned to the 
outright ownership tenure category. Before presenting our results we note that on the basis of this 
allocation method, the two housing tenure categories with the lowest proportion of income units; 
namely, public renters and the other rental (rent-free) category are even more under-represented in 
terms of the distribution of predicted tenure states, giving us quite small samples in these two 
tenures. The housing tenure variables in Table 4 are all dummy variables and so the stated 
marginal effects refer to the impact on unemployment of the discrete 0 to 1 jump (from private 
renting to the housing tenure in question). 
For males, outright homeownership reduces the probability of unemployment by about half 
as much as does ownership with a mortgage, although both effects are significant. The marginal 
effect for male owners with a mortgage is -0.073. Hence, male owners with mortgages are 7.3 per 
cent less likely than private renters to be unemployed. In stark contrast, the probability of being 
unemployed rises sharply for public renters with the stated marginal effect for men being 0.148. 
The other rental category (the rent free category) also displays a marginally higher unemployment 
propensity than private renters.  
Similar tenure effects are found among women. Both female outright owners and female 
owners with mortgages display significantly lower probabilities of being unemployed than private 
renters. The marginal effect for female owners with a mortgage is -0.066 and -0.051 for female 21 
outright owners. These estimates are roughly comparable to the male marginal effects although the 
difference between the two effects is much smaller in the case of females. Female public renters 
have a significantly higher probability of being unemployed as compared with female private 
renters, but the public renter effect is much smaller than in the case of men. 
Generally our results using predicted housing tenure confirm those found using actual 
housing tenure states. There is, however, one important difference. We find significant public 
housing impacts in the case of actual tenure but when we move to predicted public housing we find 
no significant effect. The under-prediction of public housing together with the relatively small 
sample of predicted public renters may lie behind this result. 
In Table 5 we restrict ourselves to homeowners only and consider the role of leverage by 
entering the actual and predicted loan-to-value ratio as a continuous variable in models for all 
homeowners and for owners with a mortgage. Predicted loan-to-value ratios are based on an OLS 
model including income, age, education, and other socio-demographic variables (see Appendix 
Table 3). For males, both the actual and predicted loan-to-value ratios have significant negative 
effects on the probability of unemployment among all homeowners. The marginal effect for men 
(actual leverage) is -0.013, which means that a one percentage point increase in the loan-to-value 
ratio (e.g., from 0.49 to 0.50), reduces the probability of being unemployed by 0.013 points. When 
we move to owners with mortgages alone we find no significant leverage effect. What this 
suggests is that those holding mortgages behave differently than those without mortgages 
controlling for observable forces but that when one mortgagee is compared to another, those men 
with higher leverage ratios do not exhibit a lower probability of unemployment. There is only one 
significant leverage effect in the case of women: actual leverage among female mortgagees is 
opposite to that for men and counter to the arguments on leverage we have presented. Higher 
actual leverage increases the probability of unemployment. 22 
II.  The Duration of Unemployment 
We have defined the completion of a spell of unemployment in three different ways with the exit to 
full-time employment the most stringent and meaningful definition of a spell ending. For this latter 
spell ending type we also undertake an additional analysis where we restrict spells to workers who 
we know were employed at the beginning of the 8-month window. While this definition of a spell 
limits spells to workers whom we know lost jobs in the relevant period, it comes at some cost as it 
squeezes the maximum dimensions of the data window (by one month) over which we can view 
the progress of the spell. It also reduces the number of potential spells. 
We begin with a descriptive picture of spell duration by presenting unemployment spell 
survival curves by housing tenure type for males and females. The survival curve plots the 
cumulative proportion of those who remain in unemployment (i.e., they ‘survive’ in the state of 
unemployment) at different monthly points. The first set of survival curves presented in figure 2 
(figures 2a to 2f) refer to spells that have no restriction placed on them in terms of when the spell 
begins but are distinguished according to each of the three spell ending types (NILF + 
employment, employment, and full-time employment). The final set of survival curves (figures 2g 
and 2h), refer to unemployment spells of job losers. 
There are three striking features of the survival curves presented in figure 2. The first is the 
steepness of the survival curve in the first two or so months of the 8-month window. This early 
steepness indicates that most spells of unemployment end quickly.
10 After a short period, the 
hazard rate drops off rapidly and so the cumulative survival curve flattens out. The second striking 
feature is the prominent role played by housing tenure. At one end of the survival curve spectrum 
lie the survival curves for owners with a mortgage, which typically reveal more rapid early exit 
                                                      
10 The caveat here is that figures 2a to 2g include left censored spells and so the rapid decline includes unemployment 
spells beginning before the data window ending in the first month as well as fresh spells beginning in the data window 
ending rapidly. 23 
from the unemployment spell than the other housing tenures. At the other end of the spectrum lie 
the survival curves for public renters, which almost always reveal relatively slow exit from 
unemployment. In between these two boundaries typically lie the survival curves of the remaining 
three tenure categories: owners without mortgages, private renters and the other tenure (rent-free) 
category. 
The third key feature of the survival curves displayed in figure 2 is the shift as we move 
between the various definitions of when an unemployment spell ends and when a spell begins, with 
these shifts displaying a strong gender connection. For instance, when we utilize the broadest 
definition of an unemployment spell end, that of any exit from unemployment, the cumulative 
survival curve for women is very steep suggesting rapid exit from unemployment. But, relative to 
men, the survival curves for women become relatively flat as we move to stricter employment-
related definitions of spell endings. Why the difference? Because women, much more than men, 
make the unemployment to out of the labor force transition and this transition is ignored in the case 
of the employment-related spell ending types. (We ignore the transition to the NILF category in the 
employment-related definitions of a spell exit so that the spell of unemployment continues until an 
employment-related transit occurs.) 
Moreover, for men, the largest gap between the survival curves for owners with mortgages 
and public renters occurs in the case of exit to full-time employment (refer to figures 2e and 2g). 
This pattern does not hold for women. Women in the private rental and other rental categories 
display more rapid exit from unemployment (to full-time employment) than owners with 
mortgages (see figures 2f and 2h). This is evidence in favor of the Oswald thesis. 
The survival curves displayed in figures 2a to 2h do not control for confounding factors. 
We, therefore, move to formal modeling of unemployment spells. Our results are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5 with the sequencing of models following that of the unemployment probits. For 24 
space reasons, we only report the estimated coefficients of the key variables of interest (housing 
variables and the replacement ratio) and include hazard ratios for ready interpretation. For 
continuous variables, the hazard ratio gives the percentage increase (if the ratio is greater than one; 
decrease if less than one) in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the covariate. If the variable is 
dichotomous, the hazard ratio gives the risk of exit relative to the default. A hazard ratio greater 
than one indicates that unemployed people with the designated characteristic exit the 
unemployment state more quickly than the indicated alternative state. If the hazard ratio is less than 
one, unemployed people with the given characteristic have a greater chance of ‘survival’ in 
unemployment than the default category with the degree of lower risk given by the hazard ratio 
value. 
Table 6 presents hazard model estimates of the impact of homeownership and the predicted 
replacement ratio on the spell of unemployment.
11 The ‘risk’ of a female homeowner exiting the 
unemployment spell into employment is insignificantly different from that for female non-
homeowners (see Model B, C and D results in Table 6). Notice, however, in terms of the Model A 
results, that the risk of a female homeowner exiting an unemployment spell altogether, regardless 
of the type of exit specified, is significantly higher than that of the non-homeowner; female 
homeowners have a 12.9 per cent higher risk. That is, female homeowners have a higher 
propensity to exit the labor force during a spell of unemployment than do female non-homeowners, 
confirming the relationship evident in the survival curves. 
The ‘risk’ of a male homeowner undertaking the transition to full-time employment is 
significantly higher than for male non-homeowners (see Table 6 Model C). The hazard ratio for 
men for this model is 1.222, which means that male homeowners have a 22.2 percent higher ‘risk’ 
                                                      
11 In the duration analysis, we restrict attention to models using actual homeownership, actual housing tenure and actual 
leverage given space limitations and focus on the impact of the different spell endings. We note, however, that in 
preliminary analyses (not reported), we included both actual homeownership and the homeownership error term in our 
Table 6 hazard models but found that the home ownership error term was insignificant across the various models. 25 
of exiting unemployment within the eight-month window than do male renters (of all rental types); 
a result that strongly contradicts the Oswald thesis. One interesting feature of the results from other 
models presented in Table 6 is the fall in the male homeowner relative risk of exiting 
unemployment as a less strict definition of a spell end is utilized. In the case of a definition of a 
spell ending when a male unemployed person obtains full-time employment, the relative risk for 
males is 1.222 while for more inclusive exits the relative risk drops below 1.13. We attempted to 
estimate a hazard model on the basis of job loser spells and a full-time employment exit definition 
of a spell but that model did not produce meaningful results. 
Table 7 reports hazard model results utilizing all five housing tenure categories and, for 
homeowners, the loan-to-value ratio.  These results are analogous to those in Tables 4 and 5. The 
same basic models are estimated, with outright owner, an owner with a mortgage, public housing, 
and other (rent-free) tenure categories (private renting is the dropped category) in the housing 
tenure models and the loan-to-value ratio as a continuous variable in a model restricted to 
homeowners. 
As can be seen from the Table 7 Model C results for men, public renters are likely to exit 
employment far less rapidly than private renters (hazard ratio of 0.515 – 48.5 per cent lower risk). 
On the other hand, owners with mortgages are likely to exit unemployment to employment and 
especially to full-time employment far more quickly than are private renters (hazard ratios of 1.199 
and 1.444). There is no significant impact for outright owners (no Oswald effect). 
To test the role of leverage in influencing the exit from unemployment behavior of 
homeowners we restrict the sample to homeowners and include the loan-to-value ratio as an 
explanatory variable (the LVR sub-model in Table 7). We find that an increase in the loan-to-value 
ratio significantly increases the ‘risk’ of an exit from unemployment to employment and especially 
full-time employment for male homeowners. We conjecture that these results are due to the 26 
potential loss of one’s own home owing to an inability to make mortgage payments while 
unemployed. 
The effects are weakened considerably when we move to the most inclusive exit (Model 
A), including exit to out of the labor force.  When we move to the restricted model of job loser 
spells of unemployment (Model D) the results on male public renters and outright owners remain. 
While the coefficient on the owner with mortgage variable is not significant, the loan-to-value ratio 
exerts its strong effect on increasing the hazard of exit from unemployment among homeowners. 
Turning to the case of unemployment spells among women, we find that female private 
renters and owners with mortgages are indistinguishable in terms of the full-employment exit 
hazard model results (Model C).  However, both female outright owners (hazard ratio 0.586) and 
public owners (hazard ratio 0.575) have a sharply lower risk of exit from unemployment than the 
private rental group. The Oswald effect holds with a vengeance for outright female owners. This 
effect carries through to the more stringent Model D results, which restrict the sample of 
unemployment spells to job loser spells, but the public renter effect does not.  Finally, a higher 




This paper represents another test of the Oswald hypothesis that higher homeownership causes higher 
unemployment. The key explanation offered by Oswald for this outcome is that homeowners who lose their 
job face high housing-related transaction costs if they take the option of moving to another region to obtain 
employment. There is obvious truth in this. However, it is also true that a range of housing-related channels 
link housing and labor markets. One of these is that homeowners with large mortgages might be more 
willing to accept wage cuts and/or ratchet up work effort (productivity) in order to remain employed or to 
                                                      
12 Male exits are slowed, but not significantly.  However, the coefficient is significant for the homeowners-only model. 27 
exit unemployment quicker than renters (or owners without large mortgages) because of the requirement to 
meet mortgage repayments to save their house. This housing-labor link suggests that we should expect 
significant differences within the homeowner group in terms of labor market behavior. 
Likewise, Oswald’s thesis ignores the role of public housing and rent-free housing. Public renters 
and rent-free ‘renters’ may be ‘locked in’ to their present abodes and face high costs of their own (but of a 
different nature to those experienced by homeowners) if they consider accepting a job offer particularly 
when it involves a move to another locality. Transaction costs are not the key driver as in the case of 
homeowners; rather the key to the poor labor market outcome is the potential loss of secure low-rent 
tenancies that are, in the main, location-specific. What this implies is that unless account is taken of 
homeowner leverage and multiple rental categories, we are unlikely to obtain an accurate and 
comprehensive overview of how housing affects the labor market. 
Our analysis of the probability of being unemployed and of the duration of unemployment spells is 
based on the pooling of four consecutive annual surveys of the SIHC during the mid-1990s all conducted 
broadly under the same sampling conditions and in a period of stable economic growth in Australia.  In the 
duration analysis we distinguish carefully between the labor force states that a person may exit to (the 
competing risks they face). We therefore, distinguish between an exit from unemployment to employment 
(and then make the further part-time versus full-time employment distinction) and from unemployment to 
out of the labor force. 
A variety of estimations are performed. In terms of the probability of being unemployed, in no case 
do we find evidence in support of the Oswald hypothesis that owners have worse employment outcomes 
that private renters, and in most cases we find evidence of the opposite – higher homeownership causes 
lower unemployment. Further, owners have significantly quicker exits from unemployment than do private 
renters, male to full time employment and females out of the labor force. More importantly, however, we 
show that the key to the counter Oswald results for males is that owners with mortgages display the lower 
probability of being unemployed and experience higher relative risks of exit from a spell of unemployment. 28 
In fact, outright owners, especially females, have significantly slower exits from unemployment, especially 
to full time employment.  This is the only support we find for the Oswald hypothesis. 
Just as the degree of leverage affects homeowners’ probability of becoming unemployed and their 
duration if unemployed, the type of renter status affects renters’ probabilities and durations. Both public 
housing tenants and those living rent-free are more likely than private renters to become unemployed, and 
public renters who become unemployed have longer durations than do private or rent-free renters. 
Finally, our results indicate a significant impact of the predicted replacement ratio (unemployment 
benefits to wage if reemployed) on unemployment behavior.  Persons with a higher predicted ratio are 
significantly more likely to become unemployed and unemployed females with higher predicted ratio have 
longer unemployment spells than do those with lower predicted ratios.  Unemployed males with high 
replacement ratios have longer unemployment spells but significantly so only in the homeowners-only 
model. 29 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics                   
     Income Units*
  Persons All  Owners
   No. % No.  %  No. %
Data Set           
N  56370 100.0 35600  100.0  19836 100.0
Exclusions           
Respondents Aged 65 and over  8416 14.9 6325  17.8  4853 24.5
Respondent Dependent Children (aged Over  15)  3610 6.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Data Set After Exclusions           
N  44344  29275   14983 
Housing Tenure           
Outright Owners  12703 28.6 6985  23.9  6985 46.6
Owners with Mortgages  14165 31.9 7998  27.3  7998 53.4
All Owners  26868 60.6 14983  51.2  14983 100.0
Private Renters  11929 26.9 9594  32.8  n.a. n.a.
Public Renters  1903 4.3 1431  4.9  n.a. n.a.
Other Tenures (Rent-free)  3644 8.2 3267  11.2  n.a. n.a.
Labor Force           
Employed 31182 70.3 22207  75.9  12324 82.3
Unemployed 2784 6.3 2307  7.9  570 3.8
Not in the Labor Force  10378 23.4 4761  16.3  2089 13.9
    
Unemployment Rate (Persons)  Female Male    
Outright  Owners  4.44 5.84     
Owners with Mortgages  3.52 2.95       
All Owners  3.89 4.14     
Private  Renters  12.52 13.43     
Public  Renters  24.94 33.79     
Other Tenures (Rent-free)  14.12 15.94       




Table 2 The Distribution of Loan-to-Value Ratios, Real Weekly Earnings, Real Weekly 
Unemployment Benefits, and the Predicted Replacement Ratio, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC. 
      10th  50th 90th 
   MeanPercentilePercentile Percentile 
Owners with mortgages (income units)        
Loan-to-value ratio  0.44           0.06 0.41 0.83 
Females        
Actual weekly wages (employed) $  477 325 454 678 
Actual weekly unemployed benefits (unemployed) $ 130 56 127 216 
Predicted replacement ratio (employed) 0.27 0.14 0.25 0.42 
Predicted replacement ratio (unemployed) 0.33 0.14 0.30 0.56 
Males        
Actual weekly wages (employed) $  720 472 705 996 
Actual weekly unemployed benefits (unemployed) $ 124 53 454 166 
Predicted replacement ratio (employed) 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.28 
Predicted replacement ratio (unemployed) 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.31 
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Table 3 Probit Model: Probability of Being Unemployed, Males and Females, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC           
  Males                    Females                 
  Model 1     Model 2    Model 3       Model 1    Model 2    Model 3      
    Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.  DF/dx  Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.  DF/dx
Constant  -1.696 
0.000 -1.458 0.000 -1.473 0.000  -1.456 0.000 -1.335 0.000 -1.505 0.000 
Homeowner  -0.611 0.000 -1.844 0.000      -0.631 0.000 -1.778 0.000   
Predicted homeowner       -1.842 0.000 -0.235       -1.673 0.000 -0.192
Homeownership error term     1.448 0.000      1.343 0.000   
Predicted replacement ratio  2.200 0.000 1.571 0.000 1.675 0.000 0.213 0.887 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.828 0.000 0.095
Couple  0.030 0.856 0.515 0.003 0.521 0.003 0.059  -0.334 0.124 0.002 0.993 -0.093 0.670 -0.011
Sole parent  -0.187 0.178 -0.076 0.591 -0.099 0.482 -0.012  -0.040 0.610 -0.106 0.187 -0.123 0.122 -0.013
Married or defacto  0.023 0.891 0.245 0.159 0.259 0.138 0.031 0.210 0.332 0.539 0.015 0.568 0.009 0.059
Separated, widowed, divorced  0.077 0.174 0.489 0.000 0.506 0.000 0.089 0.161 0.005 0.551 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.079
No. of dep. children in the income unit  0.008 0.739 0.074 0.002 0.075 0.002 0.010  -0.045 0.135 0.017 0.583 0.015 0.634 0.002
Youngest child less than 1 year old  -0.132 0.123 -0.359 0.000 -0.357 0.000 -0.035 0.381 0.001 0.216 0.066 0.203 0.080 0.027
Youngest child 1 year old  -0.005 0.953 -0.242 0.005 -0.258 0.003 -0.027 0.068 0.533 -0.085 0.450 -0.089 0.419 -0.010
Youngest child 2 years old  -0.136 0.145 -0.339 0.000 -0.346 0.000 -0.034  -0.010 0.930 -0.134 0.258 -0.115 0.322 -0.012
Youngest child 3 years old  -0.119 0.261 -0.269 0.013 -0.256 0.016 -0.027 0.206 0.073 0.117 0.317 0.136 0.236 0.017
Youngest child 4 years old  -0.207 0.075 -0.368 0.002 -0.372 0.002 -0.036 0.134 0.258 0.046 0.701 0.043 0.721 0.005
Youngest child 5 years old  -0.176 0.128 -0.304 0.010 -0.316 0.007 -0.032 0.182 0.137 0.109 0.380 0.129 0.291 0.016
Youngest child 6 to 9 years old  -0.178 0.031 -0.284 0.001 -0.277 0.001 -0.029 0.181 0.029 0.149 0.078 0.153 0.069 0.019
Youngest child 10 or older  -0.045 0.530 -0.071 0.325 -0.069 0.338 -0.008 0.069 0.377 0.094 0.236 0.095 0.228 0.012
Sydney  -0.070 0.305 -0.079 0.251 -0.078 0.259 -0.009  -0.079 0.314 -0.068 0.395 -0.062 0.433 -0.007
Country NSW  0.276 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.053 0.222 0.010 0.264 0.003 0.258 0.003 0.035
Melbourne  0.145 0.025 0.232 0.000 0.228 0.000 0.033 0.133 0.076 0.216 0.005 0.201 0.008 0.026
Country Victoria  0.188 0.018 0.312 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.047 0.086 0.388 0.176 0.081 0.158 0.115 0.020
Brisbane  0.032 0.662 0.069 0.363 0.064 0.389 0.009 0.012 0.889 0.037 0.671 0.025 0.770 0.003
Country Queensland  0.240 0.001 0.284 0.000 0.279 0.000 0.042 0.230 0.006 0.254 0.003 0.247 0.003 0.033
Adelaide  0.276 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.343 0.000 0.054 0.181 0.030 0.251 0.003 0.237 0.005 0.03234 
Table 3 Probit Model: Probability of Being Unemployed, Males and Females, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC           
  Males                    Females                 
  Model 1     Model 2    Model 3       Model 1    Model 2    Model 3      
Country South Australia  0.009 0.928 0.092 0.375 0.066 0.525 0.009 0.268 0.016 0.321 0.004 0.314 0.005 0.045
Perth   0.086 0.222 0.176 0.014 0.171 0.015 0.024 0.018 0.826 0.109 0.198 0.101 0.231 0.012
Country Western Australia  0.084 0.380 0.108 0.268 0.101 0.299 0.014  -0.065 0.595 -0.057 0.649 -0.059 0.633 -0.007
Hobart  0.182 0.069 0.237 0.020 0.226 0.026 0.034 0.009 0.940 0.070 0.565 0.082 0.491 0.010
Country Tasmania  0.401 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.087 0.306 0.002 0.401 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.056
Born  - Oceania  0.087 
0.291 0.004 0.960 0.014 0.864 0.002 0.161 0.075 0.100 0.275 0.125 0.170 0.016
Born  - Europe and former USSR  0.173 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.256 0.000 0.037 0.206 0.000 0.254 0.000 0.240 0.000 0.032
Born  - Middle East and N.Africa  0.773 0.000 0.711 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.139 0.738 0.000 0.683 0.000 0.641 0.000 0.117
Born  - S.E. Asia  0.409 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.061 0.452 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.067
Born  - N.E. Asia  0.132 0.359 0.075 0.606 0.091 0.529 0.012 0.438 0.002 0.354 0.017 0.344 0.020 0.051
Born  - Southern Asia  -0.202 0.195 -0.225 0.154 -0.238 0.129 -0.025 0.594 0.000 0.578 0.000 0.591 0.000 0.104
Born  - North America  -0.355 0.184 -0.501 0.072 -0.503 0.069 -0.044  -0.610 0.058 -0.612 0.062 -0.568 0.077 -0.042
Born  - Sth and Cntr America & Carib.  0.425 0.007 0.258 0.103 0.247 0.114 0.038 0.189 0.392 0.083 0.715 0.120 0.590 0.015
Born  - Africa (excl. N. Africa)  -0.124 0.484 -0.164 0.363 -0.174 0.334 -0.019 0.071 0.692 0.028 0.880 0.038 0.834 0.005
Time dummies           Not generally sig.                      
Dependent Variable: Currently Unemployed =1, Employed =0                       
N= 19223 Males and 14744 Females. Sample: In the labor force, aged under 65, and excluding dependent children over 15.       
Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as discrete changes as the variable moves from 0 to 1.         
  Model 1: Males  Model 2: Males  Model 3: Males    Model 1: Females  Model 2: Females  Model 3: Females   
  Log Lhood =-5083.6  Log Lhood =-4962.6  Log Lhood =-5018.9   Log Lhood =-3614.5  Log Lhood =-3520.4  Log Lhood =-3573.0   
  LR chi2(52) = 1089.6  LR chi2(52) = 1331.5  LR chi2(51)  =  1219.0  LR chi2(51) = 767.2  LR chi2(52) = 955.3  LR chi2(51)  =  850.2 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
  Pseudo R2=0.0968  Pseudo R2=0.1183  Pseudo R2 = 0.1083   Pseudo R2 = 0.0959  Pseudo R2 = 0.1195  Pseudo R2 = 0.1063   
  Obs. P  0.086  Obs. P  0.086  Obs. P  0.086    Obs. P  0.077  Obs. P  0.077  Obs. P  0.077   
   Pred. P  0.068 (at x-bar)  Pred. P  0.063 (at x-bar) Pred. P 0.065  (at x-bar)  Pred. P 0.060 (at x-bar) Pred. P 0.055  (at x-bar) Pred. P 0.057 (at x-bar) 
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Table 4 Probit Model: Probability of Being Unemployed, Males and Females, Tenure Effects, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC        
  Males                 Females                
  Model 1        Model 3        Model 1        Model 3       
    Coef. Sig.  DF/dx Coef. Sig.  DF/dx Coef. Sig.  DF/dx Coef. Sig.  DF/dx
Constant  -1.592 0.000 -1.612 0.000 -1.487 0.000 -1.688 0.000 
Outright owner  -0.371
0.000 -0.041      -0.522 0.000 -0.051   
Owner with a mortgage   -0.656 0.000 -0.073      -0.624 0.000 -0.066   
Public renter  0.728 0.000 0.148      0.336 0.000 0.050   
Other renter  0.042 0.340 0.005      0.074 0.164 0.009   
Predicted replacement ratio  1.592 0.000 0.202      0.738 0.000 0.087   
Predicted outright owner       -0.394 0.000 -0.045     -0.461 0.000 -0.048
Predicted owner with a mortgage        -0.826 0.000 -0.101     -0.615 0.000 -0.071
Predicted public renter       0.130 0.432 0.019     0.166 0.133 0.023
Predicted other renter       0.342 0.000 0.057     0.680 0.000 0.132
Predicted replacement ratio       1.778 0.000 0.233     0.896 0.000 0.110
Other controls (see Table 3)                               
Dependent Variable: Currently Unemployed =1, Employed =0                   
N = 19,223 Males and 14,744 Females. Sample: In the labor force, aged under 65, homeowner and excluding dependent children over  15.     
Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as discrete changes as the variable moves from 0 to 1.             
  Model 1: Males    Model 3: Males    Model 1: Females    Model 3: Females   
  Log likelihood =-5011.3  Log likelihood =-5113.3  Log likelihood =-3603.1  Log likelihood =-3653.9 
  LR chi2(54) = 1234.09  LR chi2(54)  = 1030.1  LR chi2(54) = 789.88  LR chi2(54)  =  688.23 
  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
  Pseudo R2=0.1096    Pseudo R2 =0.0915   Pseudo R2 = 0.099    Pseudo R2 = 0.086   
  Obs. P  0.086    Obs. P  0.086    Obs. P  0.077    Obs. P  0.076   
   Pred. P  0.065 (at x-bar)  Pred. P 0.068  (at x-bar)  Pred. P  0.059 (at x-bar)  Pred. P 0.062 (at x-bar) 
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Table 5 Probit Model: Probability of Being Unemployed, Leverage of Homeowners, Males and Females, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC  
  Males                 Females                
  All Homeowners     Owners with a mortgage  All Homeowners     Owners with a mortgage 
    Coef.  Sig. DF/dx Coef.  Sig. DF/dx  Coef. Sig. DF/dx Coef.  Sig. DF/dx
Model 1                
Constant  -2.845 0.000 -3.214 0.000  -2.683 0.000 -3.028 0.000 
Loan-to-value ratio  -0.175 0.034 -0.013 0.095 0.423 0.005 0.058 0.509 0.004 0.262 0.040 0.016
Predicted replacement ratio  4.735 0.000 0.352 5.352 0.000 0.290  1.468 0.000 0.105 1.450 0.000 0.090
Other controls (see Table 3)                     
Model 3                     
Constant  -2.510 0.000 -2.968 0.000  -2.337 0.000 -2.879 0.000 
Predicted loan-to-value ratio  -0.933 0.000 -0.068 -0.314 0.313 -0.017  -0.224 0.266 -0.016 -0.012 0.972 -0.001
Predicted replacement ratio  4.614 0.000 0.336 5.340 0.000 0.288  1.379 0.000 0.098 1.422 0.001 0.089
Other controls (see Table 3)                                     
Dependent Variable: Currently Unemployed =1, Employed =0                   
N (Homeowners) = 11,448 Males and 9,008 Females. N (Owners with a mortgage) = 6,722 Males and 5,233 Females.          
Sample: In the labor force, aged under 65, homeowner and excluding dependent children over 15.             
Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as discrete changes as the variable moves from 0 to 1.             
  All Homeowners    Owners with a mortgage All  Homeowners    Owners with a mortgage 
  Model 1: Males    Model 1: Males    Model 1: Females    Model 1: Females   
  Log likelihood =-1843.8  Log likelihood =-828.4  Log likelihood =-1389.3  Log likelihood =-735.8 
  LR chi2(50)  =  252.14  LR chi2(50)  =  129.1  LR chi2(49)  =  199.96  LR chi2(47)  =  148.24 
  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
  Pseudo R2 =0.064    Pseudo R2 =0.0723  Pseudo R2 = 0.067    Pseudo R2 = 0.0915 
  Obs. P  0.041    Obs. P  0.029    Obs. P  0.039    Obs. P  0.036   
  Pred. P 0.033  (at x-bar)  Pred. P 0.023  (at x-bar)  Pred. P 0.032 (at x-bar)  Pred. P 0.027 (at x-bar) 
  All Homeowners    Owners with a mortgage All  Homeowners    Owners with a mortgage 
  Model 3: Males    Model 3: Males    Model 3: Females    Model 3: Females   
  Log likelihood =-1834.0  Log likelihood =-828.3  Log likelihood =-1389.13  Log likelihood =-737.9 
  LR chi2(50)  =  278.78  LR chi2(50)  =  129.5  LR chi2(49)  =  200.74  LR chi2(47)  =  144.07 
  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
  Pseudo R2 =0.0706   Pseudo R2 =0.0725  Pseudo R2 = 0.067    Pseudo R2 = 0.0889 
  Obs. P  0.041    Obs. P  0.029    Obs. P  0.039    Obs. P  0.036   




Figure 2a Unemployment spell survival functions, males, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC. Spells defined to end 





























 Figure 2b Unemployment spell survival functions, females, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC. Spells defined to end 
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Figure 2c Unemployment spell survival functions, males, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC. Spells 
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Figure 2d Unemployment spell survival functions, females, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC. 
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Figure 2e Unemployment spell survival functions, males, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC.

























Owners without a mortgage Owners with a mortgage Private Renters Public Renters Other Renters40 
 
Figure 2f Unemployment spell survival functions, females, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC. 






























Figure 2g Unemployment spell survival functions, males, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC.  Job 
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Figure 2h Unemployment spell survival functions, females, Australia, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC.  Job 
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Table 6 Cox Proportional Hazard Models: Unemployment Spells and Home Ownership Effects, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC 
  All spells (a)                         Job loss in data window spells (b)
  Model A     Model B   Model C    Model D    
  All exits (c)       Exits to employment (d)   Exits to FT-employment (e) Exits to FT-employment (e) 
     Hazard   Hazard   Hazard   Hazard
   Coef.  Sig. Ratio Coef.  Sig. Ratio Coef.  Sig. Ratio Coef.  Sig. Ratio
Women    
Homeowner  0.122 0.013 1.129 0.090 0.185 1.094 -0.067 0.557 0.935 -0.110 0.671 0.896
Predicted replacement ratio  0.048 0.810 1.049 -1.356 0.000 0.258 -2.567 0.000 0.077 -4.224 0.001 0.015
Other controls (see Table 3 and inverse mills ratio)                 
Men                     
Homeowner  0.116 0.027 1.123 0.121 0.050 1.129 0.200 0.009 1.222 0.085 0.500 1.089
Predicted replacement ratio  -0.426 0.302 0.653 -1.517 0.003 0.219 -1.286 0.048 0.276 0.973 0.465 2.647
Other controls (see Table 3 and inverse mills ratio)                               
Sample: Aged under 65 excluding dependent children over 15.                    
  Model A     Model B    Model C    Model D    
  Males Females    Males Females   Males Females   Males Females   
Event spells  2579 2659 1860 1495 1163  596  386 159 
Right censored spells  1650 1134 1959 1779 2253  2397  498 442 
Total spells  4229 3793 3819 3274 3416  2993  884 601 
Log likelihood   40421.5 41150.8 29014.9 22891.2 17893.6  8937.4  4871 1858.4 
LR chi2(52)  90.6 127.5 111.2 160 149.8  217.6  57.3 79 
Prob > chi2    0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000  0.000   0.284 0.001  
(a) Includes left uncensored and left censored spells of unemployment and all transitions into unemployment (i.e., transitions from both employment and not in the labor force included). 
(b) Spells of unemployment of those who were employed in the first month of the data window. All left censored spells of unemployment excluded. 
(c) The spell ends when a transition is made from unemployment to any other labor force state.           
(d) The spell ends when a transition is made from unemployment to employment (both part and full-time employment.      
(e) The spell ends when a transition is made from unemployment to full-time employment.            
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Table 7 Cox Proportional Hazard Models: Unemployment Spells and Housing Tenure Effects, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC 
  All spells (a)                        
Job loss in data window 
spells (b) 
  Model A     Model B  Model C   Model D    
  All exits (c)       Exits to employment (d)  Exits to Ft-employment (e) Exits to FT-employment (e) 
     Hazard   Hazard   Hazard   Hazard
   Coef.  Sig. Ratio Coef.  Sig. Ratio Coef.  Sig.  Ratio Coef.  Sig. Ratio
WOMEN         
All tenures     
Outright owner  0.139 0.027 1.149 -0.023 0.789 0.977 -0.535 0.001 0.586 -0.553 0.095 0.575
Owner with a mortgage   0.106 0.076 1.112 0.073 0.374 1.075 0.144 0.282 1.155 0.174 0.550 1.190
Public renter  -0.028 0.711 0.972 -0.328 0.004 0.720 -0.554 0.008 0.575 -0.063 0.895 0.939
Other renter  0.106 0.136 1.112 0.029 0.744 1.029 -0.104 0.412 0.902 -0.744 0.014 0.475
Predicted replacement ratio  0.050 0.805 1.051 -1.171 0.000 0.310 -1.979 0.001 0.138 -4.139 0.001 0.016
Other controls (see Table 3 and inverse mills ratio)                  
Homeowners (LVR model)                       
Loan to value ratio  -0.086 0.449 0.917 -0.015 0.922 0.985 0.556 0.029 1.744 0.770 0.109 2.160
Predicted replacement ratio  0.080 0.839 1.083 -1.826 0.002 0.161 -2.927 0.006 0.054 -3.843 0.058 0.021
Other controls (see Table 3 and inverse mills ratio)                  
MEN                       
All tenures                       
Outright owner  0.068 0.295 1.070 -0.079 0.305 0.924 -0.170 0.087 0.844 -0.287 0.080 0.751
Owner with a mortgage   0.124 0.074 1.132 0.181 0.021 1.199 0.367 0.000 1.444 0.178 0.251 1.195
Public renter  -0.170 0.050 0.844 -0.473 0.000 0.623 -0.664 0.000 0.515 -0.644 0.025 0.525
Other renter  0.090 0.146 1.094 -0.010 0.895 0.990 -0.058 0.535 0.944 -0.435 0.030 0.647
Predicted replacement ratio  -0.318 0.434 0.728 -1.165 0.026 0.312 -0.755 0.234 0.470 1.452 0.289 4.270
Other controls (see Table 3 and inverse mills ratio)                  
Homeowners (LVR model)                        
Loan to value ratio  -0.037 0.788 0.964 0.327 0.034 1.387 0.690 0.000 1.995 0.802 0.007 2.230
Predicted replacement ratio  -0.812 0.441 0.444 -3.246 0.007 0.039 -3.598 0.015 0.027 -0.138 0.958 0.871
Other controls (see Table 3 and inverse mills ratio)                                
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Sample: Aged under 65 excluding dependent children over 15.                   
  Model A     Model B   Model C    Model D    
All housing tenures  Males Females    Males Females  Males Females    Males Females   
Event spells  2579 2659 1860 1495  1163 596    386 159 
Right censored spells  1650 1134 1959 1779  2253 2397    498 442 
Total spells  4229 3793 3819 3274  3416 2993    884 601 
Log likelihood   40413.5 41148.1 28985.6 22880.8  17846.9 8910.9   4854.7 1846.0 
LR chi2(55)  98.3 130.2 138.7 170.0  196.7 241.6    72.8 92.6 
Prob > chi2    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000   0.054 0.000 
                        
Homeowners (LVR models)   Males Females    Males Females   Males Females    Males Females   
Event spells  859 1089 614 579  408 195    178 67 
Right censored spells  473 353 595 646  681 933    209 233 
Total spells  1332 1442 1209 1225  1089 1128    387 300 
Log likelihood   11461.1 14784.1 8172.2 7747.2  5330.5 2540.5   1934.9 673.5 
LR chi2(52)  56.8 61.0 75.4 78.1 103.8 90.8    51.5 53.6 
Prob > chi2    0.300 0.184 0.019 0.011  0.000 0.001   0.453 0.178 
                                     
(a) Includes left uncensored and left censored spells of unemployment and all transitions into unemployment (i.e., transitions from both employment and not in the 
labor force included). 
(b) Spells of unemployment of those who were employed in the first month of the data window. All left censored spells of unemployment excluded. 
(c) The spell ends when a transition is made from unemployment to any other labor force state.             
(d) The spell ends when a transition is made from unemployment to employment (both part and full-time employment.       




Appendix Table 1 Probability of an Income Unit Being a Home Owner, 1993-94 to 1996-97 
SIHC, Probit Model 
       
   Coef. Std. Err. Sig. DF/dx 
Constant -3.042 0.124 -24.44 
Earned Income of the Income Unit  1.17E-05 3.92E-07 29.87 1.560E-07 
Sydney 0.035 0.043 0.83 0.014 
Country NSW  0.219 0.048 4.57 0.087 
Melbourne 0.333 0.042 7.91 0.132 
Country Victoria  0.449 0.054 8.38 0.176 
Brisbane 0.230 0.047 4.89 0.092 
Country Queensland  0.225 0.046 4.87 0.090 
Adelaide 0.375 0.047 8.02 0.148 
Country South Australia  0.282 0.064 4.37 0.112 
Perth   0.411 0.045 9.07 0.162 
Country Western Australia  0.158 0.061 2.57 0.063 
Hobart 0.270 0.066 4.11 0.107 
Country Tasmania  0.418 0.058 7.25 0.164 
Couple income unit  0.717 0.087 8.23 0.280 
Single female income unit  0.124 0.030 4.16 0.050 
Sole parent male income unit  0.160 0.089 1.80 0.064 
Sole parent female income unit  0.159 0.045 3.56 0.063 
Age  - 20 to 24  0.652 0.124 5.26 0.251 
Age  - 25 to 29  1.210 0.122 9.94 0.423 
Age  - 30 to 34  1.634 0.122 13.41 0.517 
Age  - 35 to 39  1.850 0.122 15.13 0.551 
Age  - 40 to 44  2.062 0.123 16.80 0.577 
Age  - 45 to 49  2.218 0.123 18.03 0.590 
Age  - 50 to 54  2.405 0.124 19.41 0.588 
Age  - 55 to 59  2.655 0.125 21.27 0.590 
Age  - 60 to 64  2.779 0.125 22.15 0.587 
Higher degree  -0.143 0.066 -2.18 -0.057  
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Appendix Table 1 Probability of an Income Unit Being a Home Owner, 1993-94 to 1996-97 
SIHC, Probit Model 
       
   Coef. Std. Err. Sig. DF/dx 
Postgraduate diploma  0.206 0.061 3.39 0.082 
Bachelor degree  0.114 0.033 3.42 0.045 
Undergraduate diploma  0.094 0.055 1.71 0.037 
Associate diploma  0.178 0.038 4.63 0.071 
Skilled vocational  0.201 0.024 8.54 0.080 
Basic vocational  0.078 0.054 1.45 0.031 
Married or defacto  0.265 0.087 3.05 0.105 
Separated, widowed, divorced  0.215 0.032 6.83 0.086 
Number of dependent children in the unit  0.062 0.011 5.76 0.025 
Country of birth  - Oceania  -0.354 0.055 -6.40 -0.137 
Country of birth  - Europe + former USSR  -0.036 0.026 -1.38 -0.014 
Country of birth  - Middle East + N.Africa  -0.188 0.079 -2.38 -0.074 
Country of birth  - S.E. Asia  -0.146 0.057 -2.58 -0.058 
Country of birth  - N.E. Asia  -0.268 0.085 -3.16 -0.105 
Country of birth  - Southern Asia  -0.253 0.093 -2.73 -0.099 
Country of birth  - North America  -0.379 0.126 -3.02 -0.146 
Country of birth  - Sth/Cntr America+Carib. -0.498 0.125 -4.00 -0.188 
Country of birth  - Africa (excl. N. Africa)  -0.374 0.103 -3.62 -0.144 
Dependent Variable Home Owner =1, Not Home Owner=0     
Quarterly time dummies included in a preliminary equation but were insignificant and dropped from the 
final probit used to predict homeownership. 
 
N=29279 Income Units. Sample: Reference Person Aged under 65.     
      
  Log likelihood = -12331.3  Obs. P 0.5118   
  LR chi2(40) = 15910.4    Pred. P .478067 (at x-bar) 
  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000     
  Pseudo R2 =  0.3921      
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Appendix Table 2 Multinomial Logit Model of Tenure Outcomes, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC.       
      Owner with a        
  Outright Owner  Mortgage   Public Renter Other tenure
   Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.
Constant -6.463 0.000 -5.813 0.000 -2.880 0.000 -0.229 0.088
Earned Income of the Income Unit  1.440E-05 0.000 1.970E-05 0.000 -3.540E-05 0.000 -8.500E-06 0.000
Sydney 0.161 0.109 -0.307 0.000 -1.379 0.000 0.112 0.267
Country NSW  0.562 0.000 -0.069 0.487 -1.480 0.000 0.319 0.005
Melbourne 0.641 0.000 0.258 0.002 -1.596 0.000 0.370 0.000
Country Victoria  0.959 0.000 0.352 0.001 -1.576 0.000 0.339 0.007
Brisbane 0.288 0.009 0.058 0.536 -1.459 0.000 -0.147 0.194
Country Queensland  0.358 0.001 -0.148 0.117 -2.331 0.000 -0.137 0.224
Adelaide 0.776 0.000 0.521 0.000 -0.453 0.000 0.097 0.391
Country South Australia  1.046 0.000 0.408 0.004 -0.296 0.101 0.843 0.000
Perth   0.567 0.000 0.434 0.000 -1.342 0.000 -0.092 0.407
Country Western Australia  0.303 0.034 -0.044 0.725 -1.427 0.000 0.180 0.230
Hobart 0.502 0.001 0.313 0.017 -0.559 0.002 -0.165 0.305
Country Tasmania  0.969 0.000 0.376 0.002 -0.937 0.000 0.048 0.733
Couple income unit  1.303 0.000 1.120 0.000 0.850 0.005 -0.654 0.003
Single female income unit  0.387 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.468 0.000 0.057 0.238
Sole parent male income unit  0.321 0.125 0.389 0.030 1.023 0.000 -0.519 0.121
Sole parent female income unit  0.607 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.377 0.000 -1.110 0.000
Age  - 20 to 24  0.447 0.358 2.156 0.000 0.879 0.000 -0.612 0.000
Age  - 25 to 29  1.635 0.000 3.106 0.000 1.591 0.000 -0.918 0.000
Age  - 30 to 34  2.746 0.000 3.748 0.000 1.960 0.000 -0.889 0.000
Age  - 35 to 39  3.532 0.000 4.003 0.000 2.248 0.000 -0.894 0.000
Age  - 40 to 44  4.281 0.000 4.230 0.000 2.431 0.000 -0.724 0.000
Age  - 45 to 49  4.872 0.000 4.357 0.000 2.762 0.000 -0.695 0.000
Age  - 50 to 54  5.581 0.000 4.511 0.000 3.253 0.000 -0.420 0.002
Age  - 55 to 59  6.201 0.000 4.584 0.000 3.335 0.000 -0.392 0.010
Age  - 60 to 64  6.773 0.000 4.287 0.000 3.709 0.000 -0.006 0.972
Higher degree  -0.426 0.002 -0.440 0.001 -2.877 0.000 -0.291 0.170
Postgraduate diploma  0.120 0.380 0.340 0.005 -1.408 0.001 0.007 0.968 
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Appendix Table 2 Multinomial Logit Model of Tenure Outcomes, 1993-94 to 1996-97 SIHC.       
      Owner with a        
  Outright Owner  Mortgage   Public Renter Other tenure
   Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.
Bachelor degree  0.089 0.237 0.111 0.092 -1.513 0.000 0.117 0.125
Undergraduate diploma  -0.047 0.693 0.141 0.199 -1.110 0.000 0.282 0.046
Associate diploma  0.183 0.032 0.253 0.001 -0.734 0.000 0.064 0.493
Skilled vocational  0.214 0.000 0.287 0.000 -0.492 0.000 -0.099 0.119
Basic vocational  0.032 0.797 0.112 0.301 -0.151 0.318 -0.182 0.089
Married or defacto  0.078 0.695 0.530 0.004 -0.077 0.793 -0.129 0.535
Separated, widowed, divorced  -0.111 0.135 0.413 0.000 -0.021 0.823 -0.673 0.000
Number of dependent children in the unit 0.186 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.334 0.000 0.039 0.407
Country of birth  - Oceania  -0.964 0.000 -0.577 0.000 -0.183 0.310 -0.601 0.000
Country of birth  - Europe + former USSR -0.112 0.048 -0.094 0.086  -0.179 0.057 -0.160 0.046
Country of birth  - Middle East + N.Africa -0.389 0.026 -0.309 0.057  -0.197 0.390 -0.166 0.445
Country of birth  - S.E. Asia  -0.402 0.003 -0.115 0.304  0.345 0.033 -0.099 0.437
Country of birth  - N.E. Asia  -0.381 0.042 -0.629 0.000  -1.127 0.004 0.258 0.147
Country of birth  - Southern Asia  -0.760 0.000 -0.356 0.051 -0.066 0.853 -0.192 0.448
Country of birth  - North America  -0.864 0.003 -0.681 0.005 -1.866 0.071 -0.075 0.794
Country of birth  - Sth/Cntr America+Carib. -1.252 0.000 -0.538 0.025 0.296 0.378 0.125 0.634
Country of birth  - Africa (excl. N. Africa) -1.224 0.000 -0.470 0.015 -0.563 0.210 -0.115 0.645
Quarterly time dummies  Mixed Significance  Generally Insignificant Generally Insignificant Generally Insignificant 
Private Renter is the omitted tenure type category.             
              
N=29279 Income Units. Sample: Reference Person Aged under 65.           
  Log likelihood = -30533.327         
  LR chi2(240) = 24094.53          
  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000           
  Pseudo R2 =  0.2829           
                           
49 
Appendix Table 3 Ordinary Least Squares Model of the Loan-to-Value Ratio, 1993-94 to 
1996-97 SIHC. 
      Owners with a 
  All Owners  Mortgage    
   Coef. Sig. Coef.  Sig. 
Constant 0.461 0.000 0.765  0.000 
Earned Income of the Income Unit  2.910E-07 0.000 -3.860E-09  0.966 
Sydney -0.073 0.000 -0.074  0.000 
Country NSW  -0.075 0.000 -0.043  0.004 
Melbourne -0.053 0.000 -0.033  0.009 
Country Victoria  -0.072 0.000 -0.041  0.013 
Brisbane -0.033 0.003 -0.019  0.187 
Country Queensland  -0.059 0.000 -0.022  0.129 
Adelaide -0.025 0.021 -0.002  0.906 
Country South Australia  -0.073 0.000 -0.028  0.182 
Perth   -0.046 0.000 -0.053  0.000 
Country Western Australia  -0.062 0.000 -0.048  0.013 
Hobart -0.034 0.020 -0.026  0.185 
Country Tasmania  -0.095 0.000 -0.071  0.000 
Couple income unit  -0.035 0.155 -0.051  0.145 
Single female income unit  -0.009 0.361 -0.023  0.093 
Sole parent male income unit  0.020 0.397 -0.006  0.859 
Sole parent female income unit  -0.001 0.927 -0.017  0.344 
Age  - 20 to 24  0.267 0.001 0.038  0.738 
Age  - 25 to 29  0.138 0.086 -0.086  0.451 
Age  - 30 to 34  0.047 0.561 -0.153  0.179 
Age  - 35 to 39  -0.063 0.433 -0.238  0.037 
Age  - 40 to 44  -0.145 0.069 -0.296  0.010 
Age  - 45 to 49  -0.233 0.004 -0.371  0.001 
Age  - 50 to 54  -0.296 0.000 -0.414  0.000 
Age  - 55 to 59  -0.344 0.000 -0.458  0.000 
Age  - 60 to 64  -0.382 0.000 -0.513  0.000 
Higher degree  -0.020 0.124 -0.037  0.035 
Postgraduate diploma  0.006 0.594 -0.018  0.254 
Bachelor degree  -0.009 0.214 -0.021  0.030 
Undergraduate diploma  -0.011 0.333 -0.038  0.017 
Associate diploma  -0.018 0.027 -0.047  0.000 
Skilled vocational  -0.014 0.006 -0.028  0.000  
50 
Appendix Table 3 Ordinary Least Squares Model of the Loan-to-Value Ratio, 1993-94 to 
1996-97 SIHC. 
      Owners with a 
  All Owners  Mortgage    
   Coef. Sig. Coef.  Sig. 
Basic vocational  0.027 0.055 0.042  0.027 
Married or defacto  0.058 0.021 0.024  0.509 
Separated, widowed, divorced  0.045 0.000 0.018  0.176 
Number of dependent children in the unit  -0.013 0.000 -0.014  0.000 
Country of birth  - Oceania 0.054 0.000 0.044  0.013 
Country of birth  - Europe + former USSR  0.019 0.000 0.038  0.000 
Country of birth  - Middle East + N.Africa  0.045 0.018 0.082  0.002 
Country of birth  - S.E. Asia  0.044 0.002 0.047  0.009 
Country of birth  - N.E. Asia  -0.024 0.282 0.006  0.861 
Country of birth  - Southern Asia  0.114 0.000 0.138  0.000 
Country of birth  - North America  0.064 0.048 0.081  0.055 
Country of birth  - Sth/Cntr America+Carib. 0.150 0.000 0.176  0.000 
Country of birth  - Africa (excl. N. Africa)  0.072 0.002 0.050  0.078 
Quarterly time dummies  Generally Significant Generally Insignificant 
       
Sample: Reference Person Aged under 65.  All Owners  Owners with a Mortgage 
 N=14972    N=7997   
  F(60,14911) = 105.56  F(60,7936) = 34.45 
  Prob > F  =  0.0000  Prob > F  =  0.0000 
  Adjusted R2 = 0.2953  Adjusted R2 = 0.2067 
              
        
 